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Abstract
A prototype of an automatic truck has been developed for ore
haulage in underground gold mines in Quebec (Canada). The
control system is a computerized guidance system that is
designed to give standard underground mining haulage
vehicles the ability to operate fully automatically without an
onboard operator. It combines scanning lasers with the most
successful elements of radio remote controls on the leading
edge of mine automation. It uses also a collision avoidance
system to detect specific transponders equipping all people
and vehicles in the mine by using microwave signals. The
presentation will deal with the development of the safety
program and with what has been done in the real life-cycle of
the project.
1. INTRODUCTION
A mining company in Quebec is planning to install a
system of automatic trucks in its mine at Abitibi. This will
be the first time such a system has been used in Canada,
and the trucks will transport ore between the cutting face
and the treatment plant with no human intervention.
These automatic trucks are expected to operate in certain
areas where there are also operator-driven vehicles and
workers on foot.
As part of a safety assurance programme, the IRSST in co-
operation with INERIS has been asked to develop and
apply a safety programme to ensure that the automatically
guided vehicle system is safe enough with respect to
workers in the mine.
System operation is based upon three major components:
• A system to guide and operate the automatic
trucks employing fixed markers (overhead
reflecting strips and bar codes of the same type).
• An onboard device to detect people carrying
passive transducers.
• A traffic control system employing command
and communication facilities operating
throughout the site.
To ensure the safety of such a system, special efforts must
be made in its design and operation.
A particularly serious problem in obtaining an adequate
level of safety is that workers and automatic machines are
present in the same areas.
warn ure
Locations of the guidance system and the onboard
computer
Principle of the guidance system
2. PARTICULARS OF THE SYSTEM
The system is made up of four parts:
• Control of the automatic truck.
• Control of traffic.
• The truck protection systems (against fire,
overspeed, and so on).
• The collision avoidance system consisting of a
transceiver and passive transducers attached to
the helmets of the personnel (3 transducers) and
vehicles (6 transducers) which receive the signal
from the truck and transmit a signal at twice the
frequency.
When the collision avoidance system receives this double
frequency, it issues the order to stop the truck.
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At the unloading point at each cycle, the system carries out
a self-test to verify the integrity of its safety function
(checking the performance of the detection system at the
front and rear of the truck).
3. SAFETY ASSURANCE PROGRAMME
A programme of safety assurance was developed and
applied in order to ensure that the self-guided vehicle
system showed an adequate level of safety with regard to
workers.
Evaluation of the system provided data about the level of
safety resulting from the principles applied and, secondly,
provided users with further information for optimising its
use. It is based upon European standards, notably standard
Etf 954 "Safety of machinery and safety-related system
components", and on the draft international standard IEC
61508 "Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems
relative to safety".
The safety file was prepared in four main phases:
1. Analysis of system risks.
2. Definition of objectives and technical safety
requirements for the system.
3. Validation of the design and construction of the
system.
4. Evaluation of the operating safety of the system.
The safety file sets out all the analysis done together with
the tests carried out on an experimental site, together with a
summary of the necessary improvements to meet the safety
objectives. There are also certain recommendations
concerning maintenance and the operating requirements for
the machine: self-tests, periodic tests, and so on.
4. SAFETY FILE
4.1 Analysis of system risks
The aim of this phase is to identify any hazards of the
system in each operating mode: loading the truck, transfer
from the loading point to the unloading point, truck
unloading and maintenance.
The analysis was in four phases:
• Identification of hazards.
• Preliminary analysis of hazards to determine
safety-related events.
• Preliminary analysis of risks.
• Deductive analysis using causal trees.
The analysis was applied to the entire installation, i.e., the
automatic truck in its mine environment and its control
system (excluding the protective devices). The analysis
leads either to certain functions of the control system being
identified as requiring handling with a high level of safety
(guidance, braking) or, usually, to a protection system (such
as collision avoidance, overspeed) being introduced.
4.1.1 Identification of hazards
The following figure shows how hazardous situations
leading to a potential accident can be broken down:
Hazardous entity
Dangerous
Phenomenon
Event or condition
(mainly of a technical nature, sometimes human)
(or failure)
Hazardous situation
Additional condition
(human or technical in nature)
(sometimes a failure)
Breakdown of potential accidents
Rear view of a mining truck fitted with the receiving antenna of the
collision avoidance system
Dangerous entities, i.e., the parts of the
installation that can be associated with an
intrinsic or potential hazard, or an external
attack. The hazardous entity has to be exposed
to an event or condition (failure of the command
system) to lead to a hazardous situation.
Hazardous situations that result from the
interaction of a hazardous entity or an external
attack with the context of or the entire
installation. This hazardous situation has to be
associated with an additional condition if it is to
be converted into a potential accident.
Potential accidents related to the interactions
between the hazardous entities and the events
causing a hazardous situation and their
consequences.
The following table gives an example of an analysis using
this model for three hazardous entities:
Analysis of hazardous entities
4.1.2 Preliminary analysis of hazards
The hazards were identified and risks analysed for the five
operating modes of the system. Three of these modes are
related directly to production (loading - transit -
unloading). One mode is associated with the maintenance
of the vehicle and the last mode corresponds to a test run
carried out at the beginning of each shift:
» Loading the truck - low speed (collision
avoidance system not in service).
» Transit of truck from loading point to unloading
point - high speed (collision avoidance system in
service).
• Unloading truck - low speed (collision
avoidance system not in service). This situation
is similar to the loading station (layout of the
unloading station to be taken into account).
• Maintenance (collision avoidance system not in
service). This situation is regarded as similar to
the loading station except as concerns the
commands by guide rail and bar codes.
• First test circuit in automatic mode with driver on
board (at the beginning of each shift).
4.1.3 Preliminary risk analysis according to EN 954
The risk analysis must also specify the level of safety with
which the control and protection functions must be
executed. According to a model proposed in standard EN
954-1, estimation of the risk takes into account the
following three parameters:
• Seriousness of damage: C
• Time spent in the hazardous zone: F
• Possibility of containing the hazard: P
Estimate of risk Seiection of categories
Cl
C2
FI
¥2
PI
P2
PI
P2
B 1
N
N
2
+
N
N
3
+
N
N
4
+
N
Starting point
of risk
estimate
• N: Category having preference
• +: Measures excessive for the risk in question
• -: Possible category requiring additional measures
The synthesis of the risk analysis was presented in the
following form:
Function
Test of the
efficiency of the
truck braking
system.
Collision
avoidance.
Hazardous event
Mechanical breakage or
failure of the brake
operating system
=> loss of control.
System failure
=> Collision with
another vehicle.
=> Collision with a
person on foot.
Existing preventive measures
Braking test carried at the mine
entrance on flat ground at each
loading cycle.
Shut down engine and apply brakes in
the event of malfunction.
Preventive maintenance procedure.
Test of system integrity during each
unloading cycle.
Shut down engine and apply brakes in
the event of malfunction.
Several transducers per person or
vehicle.
Cat.
2
2
The risk analysis may be qualitative and/or quantitative.
Each of these approaches has advantages and drawbacks;
for this reason a combination of the two is recommended
for critical installations.
4.1.4 Fault trees
General fault trees were plotted for the main undesirable
events.
They determine the various possible combinations of events
that result in an undesirable top event and allow any
common causes to be determined.
1
 Fault tree concerning collision with a person or a vehicle
4.2 Objective and technical safety requirements
This phase involves defining the safety objectives at system
level based upon the analysis of hazards and risks. As an
example, the technical requirements in category 2
applicable to the equipment are:
1. For the collision avoidance function:
• The system should be designed in such a way
that its functions self-test at appropriate intervals
(at least every second during operation).
• The system should be capable of stopping the
truck (shutting down the engine and applying the
brakes) if a fault occurs (weak on-line coverage
of faults: 60%).
• Malfunctions affecting safety (truck accidentally
starting, bar codes wrongly read) and not tested
on-line should be detected by off-line tests at
appropriate intervals to maintain a level of safety
better than 10" /year.
2. For the overspeed and braking functions:
• Malfunctions affecting the safety (failure of the
truck transmission system, failure of the braking
system) should be detected by off-line tests at
appropriate intervals to maintain a level of safety
better than lO'Vyear.
4.3 Validation of the phases of design and construction
Based upon the technical specifications laid down, this
phase covers:
• Validation of the system with regard to the
environmental constraints it is likely to
encounter.
• Validation of the methodology used for
developing the software to highlight the methods
and facilities employed to ensure safety.
4.3.1 Qualification tests
• Climatic testing: Ability to withstand cold, dry
heat, and temperature changes.
• Mechanical tests: Vibration and impacts.
4.3.2 Electrical tests
• Electrostatic discharges.
• Radiated EM fields.
• Interruptions to power supplies.
• Fluctuation in supply voltage.
4.4 Analysis of the methodology used for developing
software
As a rule, the process of software development is broken
down into activities that constitute the life cycle of a
program. This entire breakdown is translated into "quality
requirements" and is used to define the basic way of
looking at the tasks of developing, testing and evaluating
the software. Thus the aim of this analysis is to provide a
qualitative view of the functional safety level of the
program by means of an evaluation questionnaire adapted
to the application for the following phases:
• Specifications of the software.
• Preliminary design of the software.
• Detailed design.
• Writing code.
• Unit tests on the software.
• Integration tests on the software.
• Utilisation procedures.
• Development and modification of the software.
4.5 Evaluation of the functional safety of the system
Functional safety is evaluated in 3 stages:
1. Structural analysis of the system as a whole
(functional structure, common modes).
2. Evaluation of the hardware structure.
3. Evaluation of the integrity of the software.
4.5.1 Overall analysis of the system
The system must be capable of stopping the track (shutting
down the engine and applying the brakes) when a fault
occurs. Moreover it must be designed in such a way that its
functions are self-tested every second during operation.
The safety architecture concept adopted by the
manufacturer is of the lool type:
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Overall analysis of the system shows that, in its present
state, it does not present an adequate level of confidence for
utilisation in a mine.
However, in view of the test procedures devised for
detecting faults affecting:
• the collision avoidance system,
• the brakes,
• mistakes in reading or interpreting critical data
from bar codes,
consideration may be given to its use on an experimental
site on condition that appropriate safety instructions and
training arrangements are drawn up. The experimental site
investigated is located at the Val d'Or (Quebec) mining
research centre.
Diagram showing a mining vehicle integrated in the experimental
environment investigated
4.5.2 Evaluation of the hardware structure
The hardware and its structure were evaluated on the basis
of the data - occasionally preliminary - available.
4.5.3 Functional analysis
The functional analysis was done with the system broken
down to level -4 . It contains structural diagrams that
explain the technical composition of systems providing the
identified functions.
The following table gives an example of how the control-
command function for the truck's path is broken down:
Level -1
Control-command
of the truck's path
and of the driving
functions.
Level -2
Monitoring the
track's path.
Level -3
Measuring the
position of the truck
centre line with
respect to the guide
rail.
Calculate the
deviation of the truck
centre line from the
guide rail.
Level-4
• Guide rail
• Laser 1 (front)
• Laser 2 (rear)
• Angular sensor.
• Computer.
The following structural diagram supplements the
description of the path control-command function:
Front Laser
Rear Laser
Angle sensor
Digital I/O
Analog I/O < » CPU
Steer Card
Solenoid valve left ^ / ^ Solenoid valve right
Diagram showing the principle of the path control system
4.5.4 Analysis of failure modes and their effects
The main thread running through this analysis is the level
of detail of the functional analysis, and links the disclosure
of malfunctions to the safety objectives.
Function
To detect
the presence
of a vehicle
or of a
person in
the path of
the truck.
Failure
mode
Spurious
detection.
Cause of
failure
Faulty
transtnissio
n relay.
Effect on
the
function
Truck stops
even though
no vehicle
or person is
present
Detection
None.
Disposition
Maintenance.
4.6 Evaluation of the software structure
The software structure was also analysed. The program
operates in multi-task mode. It is loaded into the "RAM"
memory. A CRC16 is performed only during loading. The
system has no independent hardware watchdog.
5. CONCLUSION
The results of this study were used to prepare a safety file
that will serve as a basis for the design and evaluation of
these safety-related electronic systems.
The conclusions reached in the safety file resulted in
recommendations being made to the designer and will serve
as a basis for future experiments.
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